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Where does prepotency come from on developmental tests of inhibitory control? 
 
Abstract 
Understanding the processes that make responses prepotent is central to understanding 
the role of inhibitory control in cognitive development. The question of what makes 
responses prepotent was investigated using the two most widely studied measures of 
SUHVFKRROHUV¶inhibitory control. Across two experiments, 80 children were tested either 
on a series of Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC) tasks, or on a series of Go/No-go 
tasks. Results indicated that high levels of prepotency on SRC tasks (such as the 
Day/Night task) only occur under specific conditions: making a verbal response can be 
highly prepotent if the stimulus and response are associated with each other (e.g., saying 
³FXS´WRDFXS; but is less prepotent when they are unassociated (e.g., VD\LQJ³FXS´WRD
doorstop). Action responses (e.g., lifting a cup to your mouth) show little prepotency, 
irrespective of whether the stimulus and response are associated. In contrast, with Go/No-
go tasks, a much wider variety of behaviors are highly prepotent, regardless of whether 
the stimulus and response are associated. These data suggest that prepotency arises in 
very different ways depending on the type of task used. While both Go/No-go tasks and 
SRC tasks can make inhibitory demands, they do so for fundamentally different reasons. 
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Introduction 
Inhibitory control is the ability to suppress cognitions and behaviors that are 
incompatible with current goals. Inhibitory control undergoes protracted development 
from infancy through to adulthood, with particularly marked changes between 2 and 5 
years (Garon, Smith & Bryson, 2014; Johansson, Marciszko & Brocki, 2016; Petersen, 
Hoyniak, McQuillian, Bates & Staples, 2016; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a; Wiebe, Sheffield 
& Espy, 2012). While research clearly suggests that inhibitory control improves with age, 
this is only one part of a more complex story. To understand the place of inhibitory 
control in development, it is also necessary to understand how inhibitory demands are 
created in the first place ± in other words, to understand where prepotency comes from 
(Simpson et al., 2012). A prepotent response is a response that would be made in a given 
situation without active reflection ± that is, in the absence of intentional top-down 
control. In most instances, making a prepotent response is goal-appropriate (such as 
eating a delicious piece of chocolate). However, sometimes pursuing a goal requires that 
prepotent responses are inhibited, so that other more goal-appropriate behavior can be 
made instead (such as not eating a piece of chocolate, in order to lose weight).  
Understanding how prepotency is created is important for four reasons (Simpson et 
al., 2012). First, understanding this process is necessary in order to identify which tasks 
require inhibitory control: only tasks which contain inappropriate prepotent responses 
will be inhibitory (e.g., Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister & Riggs, 2013). Second, 
understanding this process in the laboratory will help understand when and why 
SUHVFKRROHUV¶ZHDNinhibitory control is exposed outside it. Correlational evidence 
suggests that improvements in inhibitory control are associated with the development of 
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many important skills (e.g., Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon & Gryg, 
2011; Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson & Zelazo, 2013; Cragg & Gilmore, 2013; Riggs, Jolley 
& Simpson, 2013; van Mourik, Oosterlaan & Sergeant, 2005). Nevertheless, it is not 
clear why inhibitory control is associated with these skills. A crucial question is, µ'oes 
the presence of inappropriate prepotent responses directly block the expression of these 
VNLOOV"¶. To answer this question, we need to understand the conditions that create 
prepotent responses. Third, the pattern of prepotency may change during development. 
Behavior which is prepotent at one point in development may not be prepotent at another. 
And finally, understanding prepotency can help us identify strategies to enable children 
to circumvent their inhibitory weakness (e.g., Simpson et al., 2012). 
When seeking to understand how prepotency is created, we suggest that the best 
place to start is to consider measures of inhibitory control. A meta-analysis of 
developmental studies reported that around 70% of all studies into inhibitory control used 
two measures: Stimulus-Response Compatibility (SRC) tasks and Go/No-go tasks 
(Peterson et al., 2016). In the current article, we aimed to determine why responses are 
prepotent in these two measures. 
Developmental inhibitory control tasks typically present children with a stimulus 
that evokes a prepotent response, which must then be inhibited. For example, on SRC 
tasks ± a family of tasks that includes the Day/Night task and the Grass/Snow task ± 
children are shown one of two stimuli, and asked to make one of two responses. On the 
'D\1LJKWWDVNFKLOGUHQPXVWUHVSRQGE\VD\LQJ³night´ZKHQWKH\VHHDSLFWXUHRIa 
|sun|DQG³day´ZKHQWKH\VHHDSLFWXUHRIa |moon|. Crucially, the correct response on 
the task is to make a response that is different to the stimulus on that trial. Children must 
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inhibit the tendency to make the response that is triggered by the stimulus (i.e., seeing 
|sun| triggers the incorrect response of saying ³GD\´, in order to make the task-
appropriate response instead (i.e., seeing |sun| and then saying ³QLJKW´. 
So where does this to-be-inhibited prepotency come from? One suggestion has been 
that prepotency on these tasks arises from a combination of two factors: intention and 
stimulus-response association (Simpson & Riggs, 2007). Intention refers to children 
specifically intending to make one or more particular responses on the task ± typically 
because the task instructions explicitly direct them to do so. For example, on the 
Day/Night task, children are instructed to say either ³GD\´ or ³QLJKW´. Since children 
therefore intend to make these two responses on the task, these two responses become 
primed (i.e., partially activated). Stimulus-response association refers to the stimuli and 
responses on a task being associated with each other, usually through previous 
experience. For example, a picture of a |moon| (a stimulus on the Day/Night task) is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHZRUG³night´(a response on the task) because these two things have 
reliably co-occurred in FKLOGUHQ¶V previous day-to-day experience.  
A range of findings suggest that the role of intention in creating prepotency is 
straightforward (e.g., Simpson et al., 2012; Simpson, Carroll & Riggs, 2014). Simply put, 
if children intend to make a specific response, then that response can be prepotent; and if 
children do not intend to make that response, then that response cannot be prepotent. It is 
the intention to make a particular response that causes that response to be primed; this 
SULPLQJPHDQVWKDWWKHUHVSRQVHLVKHOGLQD³KDLU-WULJJHU´VWDWHVXFKWKDWLWUHTXLUHV
much less additional activation to be output, relative to other responses the child could 
make. However, as we now outline, findings relating to the role of stimulus-response 
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association are less straightforward, and its role in creating prepotency is less well 
understood. 
Evidence from the Day/Night task is clearly consistent with the idea that 
prepotency arises because of stimulus-response associations (e.g., Simpson & Riggs, 
2005b). On the standard Day/Night task, the word ³GD\´(one of the two task responses) 
is associated with the picture of a |sun| (one of the two task stimuli); and the word ³QLJKW´
(the other task response) is associated with the picture of a |moon| (the other task 
stimulus). Inhibitory demands arise because, on every trial, the stimulus presented is 
associated with the task-inappropriate response. Seeing the picture of a |sun| triggers the 
associated responsH³GD\´DQGVHHLQJ the picture of a |moon| triggers the associated 
UHVSRQVH³QLJKW´ These associated responses must be inhibited, so that the task-
appropriate responses can be made instead. On this standard version of the task, children 
perform poorly. However, when abstract pictures are used as stimuli ± that is, pictures 
that are not DVVRFLDWHGZLWKHLWKHUWKH³GD\´RU³QLJKW´UHVSRQVH± children perform better 
(Gerstadt et al., 1994; Simpson & Riggs, 2005a). Thus, when the stimulus-response 
association is removed, the inhibitory demands of the task are greatly reduced. Since 
these abstract stimuli are unassociated with the task responses, the task-inappropriate 
response is not triggered more than the task-appropriate response, so little inhibitory 
control is required.  
These findings support the idea that prepotency comes about, in part, because of 
stimulus-response association. Note that it is not merely the familiarity of the stimuli and 
responses that creates prepotency, but rather the specific association between them. 
Indeed, when familiar stimuli are combined with familiar responses that are not 
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associated with each other (e.g., see |bird|, VD\³hat´ see |fish|, VD\³cup´), the Day/Night 
task has low inhibitory demands (Simpson et al., 2012). Familiarity is certainly necessary 
for prepotency, because only stimuli and response that are familiar can become 
associated. But familiarity alone is not sufficient; it is the strength of the association 
between these familiar stimuli and responses that determines prepotency. 
However, recent findings suggest that the explanation for how prepotency arises 
may not be so straightforward (Simpson et al., 2014). The findings suggest, first, that 
stimulus-response association may not always influence prepotency, and second, that an 
additional factor needs to be considered: the type of response that children make on a 
task. We have noted on the Day/Night task that when children respond verbally, 
responses that are associated ZLWKVWLPXOLVD\LQJ³GD\´WRDSLFWXUHRIWKH|sun|) are more 
prepotent than those that are not associated ZLWKVWLPXOLVD\LQJ³GD\´WRDn |abstract 
picture|). However, when children respond by making an action (e.g., making a drinking 
action in response to being shown a |cup|), a different pattern emerges. 
The relevant evidence comes from a study using the Artefact Go/No-go task 
(Simpson et al., 2014). On the task, children are shown a series of objects. They are 
required to respond by making an action when presented with an object of one color (Go 
trials), and to make no response when presented with an object of another color (No-go 
trials). The role of stimulus-response association was investigated across two conditions. 
In the Associated condition, the Go-trial response was to make an action associated with 
the object (e.g., when presented with a |cup|, they had to lift the cup to their mouth). In 
the Unassociated condition, the Go-trial response was to make an action that was not 
associated with the object (e.g., when presented with a |cup|, they had to lift the cup to 
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their ear). If prepotency arises because of an association between stimulus (the object) 
and response (the Go-trial action), then we would expect greater prepotency (and 
therefore more errors) in the Associated condition than in the Unassociated condition. 
However, children made as many errors with unassociated actions as they did with 
associated ones. Thus, these data suggest that, when making an action, responses which 
are not associated with the stimulus are just as prepotent as responses that are associated. 
It appears that when children respond by making an action, prepotency arises regardless 
of whether the responses on the task are associated with the stimulus or not. 
So when considering where prepotency comes from, it may be that the importance 
of stimulus-response association differs depending on the type of response that children 
make (Simpson et al., 2014). Data are consistent with the idea that any action 
responsecan be highly prepotent (e.g., both lifting a cup to your mouth and lifting a cup to 
your ear can be highly prepotent); but verbal responses are more prepotent when they are 
associated with a stimulus than when they are not (e.g. VD\LQJ³FXS´ to a |cup| is more 
prepotent than VD\LQJ³cup´WRD|phone|). However, such a conclusion may be premature, 
since one further factor must be considered: the type of task that children are tested on. In 
the studies reviewed above, the type of response children made (a verbal response versus 
an action response) is confounded with type of task used (an SRC task versus a Go/No-go 
task). Children made verbal responses on SRC tasks (Gerstadt et al., 1994; Simpson & 
Riggs, 2005a) and made action responses on Go/No-go tasks (Simpson & Riggs, 2007; 
Simpson et al., 2014). Thus, we cannot be certain whether the effect of stimulus-response 
association on prepotency arises as a function of the type of response children make, or as 
a function of the type of task that they are carrying out. So while previous data suggest 
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that stimulus-response association plays some role in creating prepotency, precisely how 
it does so is unclear.  
Prior research has indicated that prepotency arises through a combination of 
factors. One already identified factor is intention (i.e. intending to make particular 
responses on a task). There are three further factors that may, singly or in combination, 
play a role in determining prepotency: these are stimulus-response association, the type 
of response that children make, and the type of task used. The present study aimed to 
separate these three factors, to address the fundamental question of where prepotency 
comes from on developmental tests of inhibitory control. We ran two closely matched 
experiments ± one using an SRC task, one using a Go/No-go task ± each directly 
comparing the effect of stimulus-response association (associated versus unassociated) 
and type of response (verbal versus action). Together, these experiments allowed us to 
identify which factors give rise to prepotency on developmental measures of inhibitory 
control. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 used a series of SRC tasks to investigate the effects of stimulus-
response association and type of response on prepotency. 3UHVFKRROHUV¶performance was 
compared on four closely matched versions of the SRC task, in which type of response 
(Verbal versus Action) and stimulus-response association (Associated versus 
Unassociated) were systematically varied. There were four SRC conditions: Action 
Associated, Verbal Associated, Action Unassociated, and Verbal Unassociated (see Table 
1). 
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In the Action Associated SRC condition, on each trial, one of two familiar objects 
was shown, and children were asked to make the action associated with the other object. 
For example, when the stimuli objects were a cup and a phone, children were told to lift 
cups to their ear, and to put phones to their mouths. In the Verbal Associated SRC 
condition, children were shown the same two familiar objects, and were asked to say the 
name associated with the other object HJVD\³FXS´WR|phone|DQGVD\³SKRQH´WR
|cup|). In the Action Unassociated SRC condition, children were shown two unfamiliar 
objects, and were asked to make a specific action with each. The actions were the same in 
the Associated and Unassociated conditions: it was the association between stimulus and 
response that differed between conditions. Thus, in the Action Unassociated SRC 
condition, children were asked to lift a |plumbing part| to their ear, and to put a |doorstop| 
to their mouth. Finally, in the Verbal Unassociated SRC condition, children were shown 
two unfamiliar objects and asked to make specific verbal respRQVHVVD\³FXS´WRD
|plumbing part|DQGVD\³SKRQH´WRD|doorstop|).  
Method 
Participants 
Forty preschool children (age range 3;0 - 4;4 years, mean age 3;7) attending a 
preschool in rural England took part in the study. All spoke English as their first 
language, and none had any behavioral or educational problems (based on teacher report). 
The group was predominantly white and of mixed social class. Ethical approval was 
granted by the University ethics committee. Informed consent was obtained from parents 
and the head of the nursery school. 
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Design 
A within-participants 2x2 design was used, with Type of response (Action, Verbal) 
and Stimulus-response association (Associated, Unassociated) as factors. The dependent 
variable was accuracy.  
Materials 
Eight objects were used (see Figure 1). Four of the objects were familiar (toy 
mobile phone; plastic cup; toy hammer; crayon) and four were unfamiliar (plumbing part; 
doorstop; touch-light; hose part). Pilot data (n=20) were collected to check that preschool 
children knew the names and actions associated with the familiar objects, but did not 
know the names and actions associated with the unfamiliar objects. Children could 
produce 76% of the names and 83% of actions associated with the familiar objects. In 
contrast, they could produce just 5% of the names and 4% of actions associated with the 
unfamiliar objects.  
Procedure 
Each child completed all four conditions (Action Associated, Verbal Associated, 
Action Unassociated, and Verbal Unassociated). Tasks were administered over two 
sessions not more than two weeks apart, with the two Associated conditions in one 
session, and the two Unassociated conditions in the other session. The order of 
presentation of the four conditions was counterbalanced.  
All conditions shared the same basic procedure. For example, in the Verbal 
Associated SRC conditionWKHH[SHULPHQWHUVDLG³:KHQ,JLYH\RXD|cup|, say µSKRQH¶
and when I give you a |phone|VD\µFup¶´ Children were asked to repeat the responses. 
Children were explicitly told not to name the objects, and were reminded of the rules 
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before testing began. For each condition, there were four practice trials, with feedback. 
There then followed 16 test trials (8 trials with each type of object), presented in a 
pseudo-random order and without feedback. The objects were arranged in a line, and the 
experimenter moved down the line, pointing to each object in turn for about two seconds. 
The experimenter encouraged the child to make a response. Meanwhile, a confederate 
recorded these responses. If the child made more than one response, accuracy was based 
on the first response. 
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy on the four conditions is shown in Figure 2. Accuracy was poor on the 
Verbal Associated SRC condition (55%), but was better on the other three conditions 
(around 80%). There were no significant order effects, nor any effects involving object 
type. 
Data were analysed in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with Type of response 
(Action, Verbal) and Stimulus-response association (Associated, Unassociated) as 
factors. There were significant main effects for both Type of response, F(1,39)=11.2, 
p=.002, K2=.223, and Stimulus-response association, F(1,39)=34.2, p<.001, K2=.467. 
There was also a significant interaction between Type of response and Stimulus-response 
association, F(1,39)=5.05, p=.030, K2=.115. Stimulus-response association affected 
accuracy with verbal responses: accuracy was poorer in the Verbal Associated SRC 
condition than in the Verbal Unassociated SRC condition, t(39)=3.28, p=.002, 95% CI 
8.28 to 34.8%. However, there was no effect of Stimulus-response association on 
accuracy with action responses: accuracy in the Action Associated SRC condition and the 
Action Unassociated SRC condition did not differ (p=.284). 
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These data suggest that stimulus-response association and type of response interact 
when preschoolers perform SRC tasks. Children found it harder to inhibit associated 
verbal responses than unassociated ones (consistent with previous findings ± e.g., 
Gerstadt et al., 1994); however, children had little difficulty in inhibiting actions, whether 
they were associated or unassociated (a new finding in this experiment). Of the four 
combinations of responding reported here (Action Associated, Verbal Associated, Action 
Unassociated, and Verbal Unassociated), verbal responses associated with the stimulus ± 
VD\LQJ³FXS´WRD|cup| ± were the most prepotent in SRC tasks. In other words, highly 
prepotent responses only arise on SRC tasks under a very specific set of circumstances. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 used a series of Go/No-go tasks (rather than SRC tasks) to investigate 
the effects of stimulus-response association and type of response on prepotency. 
&KLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHZDVFRPSDUHGRQIRXUclosely matched versions of the Artefact 
Go/No-go task, in which type of response (Verbal versus Action) and stimulus-response 
association (Associated versus Unassociated) were systematically varied (as in 
Experiment 1). There were four Go/No-go conditions: Action Associated, Verbal 
Associated, Action Unassociated, and Verbal Unassociated (see Table 1). The eight 
objects used in Experiment 2 were identical to those used in Experiment 1.  
In the Action Associated Go/No-go condition, children were shown a series of 
familiar objects of a single type, but in two different colors (red or blue). For example, 
children were presented with a series of cups, one at a time, and were asked to put the red 
cups to their mouth (Go trials) and to make no response with blue cups (No-go trials). 
Thus, in the Action Associated Go/No-go condition, children were asked to produce the 
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action associated with the object on Go trials, and to make no response on No-go trials. In 
the Action Unassociated Go/No-go condition, children were shown a series of unfamiliar 
objects of a single type (e.g., a plumbing part), in either red or blue. The Go responses 
were the same as those used in the Action Associated condition (e.g., lifting the object to 
the mouth), but in the Action Unassociated condition these actions were not associated 
with the objects with which they were made (e.g., lifting a |plumbing part| to the mouth).  
The two Verbal conditions were constructed in a similar way. Children were asked 
to make a verbal response on Go trials, and to make no response on No-go trials. In the 
Verbal Associated Go/No-go condition, the Go response was associated with the object 
VD\³FXS´WRD|cup|); and in the Verbal Unassociated Go/No-go condition, the Go 
UHVSRQVHZDVQRWDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHREMHFWVD\³FXS´WRD_plumbing part|). 
Method 
Participants 
Forty preschool children (age range 3;0 ± 4;4 years, mean age 3;9) from nurseries in 
rural England took part in the study. 2WKHUZLVHWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHPRJUDSKLFVZHUH
similar to those of Experiment 1. 
Design and Materials 
A within-participants 2x2x2 design was used, with Trial type (Go, No-go), Type of 
response (Action, Verbal) and Stimulus-response association (Associated, Unassociated) 
as factors. The dependent variable was accuracy. The materials were identical to 
Experiment 1, except that for each type of object, there were 10 red items and 10 blue 
items (objects were either the appropriate color, or were spray-painted). 
 
Prepotency in developmental tasks 
 14 
 
Procedure 
Each child completed all four conditions (Action Associated, Verbal Associated, 
Action Unassociated, and Verbal Unassociated). Tasks were administered over two 
sessions not more than two weeks apart, with the two Associated conditions in one 
session, and the two Unassociated conditions in the other session. The order of 
presentation of the four conditions was counterbalanced. All conditions shared the same 
trial structure. For example, in the Verbal Associated Go/No-go condition, children were 
presented with a series of cups on a table: half the cups were red, and half were blue. The 
H[SHULPHQWHUVDLG³:KHQ,SRLQWWRD|red cup|VD\µFXS¶DQGZKHQ,SRLQWWRD|blue 
cup|VD\QRWKLQJ´)RUHDFKcondition, there were four practice trials, with feedback. 
There followed 20 test trials, presented in a pseudo-random order (10 Go trials and 10 
No-go trials). Feedback was not given on test trials. As in the SRC tasks, a confederate 
recorded FKLOGUHQ¶VUHVSRQVHV$UHVSRQVHZDVUHFRUGHGDVµJR¶RQFHWKHFKLOGKDGSLFNHG
XSWKHREMHFWDQGDVµQR-JR¶LIWKHFKLOGGLGQRWSLFNLWXSZLWKLQDERXWWZRVHFRQGV (at 
which time the experimenter moved on to the next object). 
Results and Discussion 
Accuracy on Go trials was high in all four conditions (from 95% to 98%; see Figure 
3). Accuracy on No-go trials was lower (from 73% to 79%). There were no significant 
effects that involved order or object type (i.e., which one of the eight objects was used). 
Data were analysed in a repeated-measures ANOVA, with Trial type (Go, No-go), 
Type of response (Action, Verbal) and Stimulus-response association (Associated, 
Unassociated) as factors. There was a significant main effect of Trial type, F(1,39)=41.2 
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p<.001, K2=.513, but no other significant main effects or interactions. The effect of Trial 
type was due to better Go trial accuracy than No-go trial accuracy. This difference 
reflects the inhibitory demands of the No-go trials, as Go responses must be inhibited on 
No-go trials (Simpson & Riggs, 2007). No-go accuracy did not differ across conditions, 
regardless of whether the responses were verbal or actions, F(1,39)=0.072, p=.789, and 
regardless of whether the responses were associated with the stimuli or not, 
F(1,39)=0.605, p=.441. Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that any 
response can be highly prepotent in a Go/No-go task. 
These data suggest that neither stimulus-response association nor the type of 
response affect prepotency on preschool Go/No-go tasks. On No-go trials, children found 
it just as hard to inhibit unassociated responses as associated responses, irrespective of 
whether those responses were verbal or actions. It appears that intention alone is 
sufficient to determine prepotency in Go/No-go tasks: intending to make the response on 
Go trials also makes that response prepotent on No-go trials, irrespective of the nature of 
the Go response. 
This observation has an important implication for the literature. Based on findings 
using a Go/No-go task, Simpson et al. (2014) concluded that action responses are 
different from verbal responses. Specifically, they suggested that the prepotency of verbal 
responses is affected by stimulus-responVHDVVRFLDWLRQVD\LQJ³FXS´WRD|cup| is more 
prepotent than VD\LQJ³FXS´WRD|plumbing part|); but that the prepotency of action 
responses is not affected by stimulus-response association (any action made with an 
object can be prepotent). However, the data from Experiment 2 suggest that neither the 
Prepotency in developmental tasks 
 16 
prepotency of names nor the prepotency of actions is affected by stimulus-response 
association, when performing a Go/No-go task.  
General Discussion 
Taken together, the results of these two experiments show that prepotency arises for 
different reasons on SRC tasks and Go/No-go tasks. On SRC tasks, high levels of 
prepotency arise only under a narrowly defined set of circumstances (Experiment 1). 
Performance was poor in the Verbal Associated condition ± indicating the presence of a 
highly prepotent response ± but good in the other three conditions (Action Associated, 
Verbal Unassociated, Action Unassociated). Thus, on SRC tasks high levels of 
prepotency only arise when children make verbal responses ± and even then, only when 
the stimuli and responses used in the task were associated with each other (e.g., saying 
³FXS´WRD|cup|). Prepotency was much lower when a verbal response was not associated 
with the stimulus HJVD\LQJ³FXS´WRD|doorstop|). It was also low for action responses, 
regardless of whether those actions were associated with the task stimulus (lifting a |cup| 
to your mouth) or not (lifting a |doorstop| to your mouth). The picture for Go/no-go tasks, 
in contrast, was simpler (Experiment 2). Children performed poorly on No-Go trials in all 
four conditions (Action Associated, Verbal Associated, Action Unassociated, and Verbal 
Unassociated). Thus, these data are consistent with the proposal that a range of responses 
can be highly prepotent on Go/No-go tasks, and that prepotency is unaffected by 
stimulus-response association. 
Previous research suggested that prepotency on developmental inhibitory control 
tasks depends on intention (e.g., Simpson et al., 2012, 2014). The present data confirm 
that intention has a central role in determining prepotency on both Go/No-go and SRC 
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tasks. However, the present data go well beyond this, and allow us to offer a more 
detailed account of how prepotency arises on the measures of inhibitory control used 
most with young children (Peterson et al., 2016). Although these two types of task 
measure the same construct, they are importantly different in the source of their 
prepotency. We now consider how prepotency is created on SRC tasks and Go/No-go 
tasks in turn. 
The origin of prepotency in SRC tasks 
In SRC tasks, the intention to respond plays a causal role in determining prepotency 
(e.g., Simpson et al., 2012). However, the effect of intention is mediated by stimulus-
response association. Prepotency is high only when task stimuli and responses are 
associated. Thus, when the task-inappropriate response is more strongly associated with 
the stimulus than the task-appropriate response is, the inappropriate response is triggered 
more, and inhibitory demands will be high. It is this relative difference in the association 
of these responses with the stimulus that creates prepotency on SRC tasks. For example, 
consider an SRC task with the rules µsee |cup|, VD\³SKRQH´¶and µsee |phone|, VD\³FXS´¶. 
When the stimulus |cup| is presented, the task-LQDSSURSULDWHUHVSRQVH³FXS´LVmore 
strongly associated with that stimulus than is the task-appropriate response ³SKRQH´. The 
stimulus |cup| triggers the response ³FXS´ more than it triggers the response ³SKRQH´, 
because LQFKLOGUHQ¶Vprevious everyday experience, a picture of a |cup| is associated with 
the word ³FXS´more than it is associated with the word ³SKRQH´SRC tasks only have 
high inhibitory demands when there is a significant difference between the relative 
association of the two responses with the stimulus. Without this difference ± for example, 
when abstract pictures are used as stimuli ± the task-inappropriate response is not 
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triggered more than the task-appropriate response. In this scenario, the task¶s inhibitory 
demands are low, because there is little need to inhibit an inappropriate response before 
making the appropriate response.  
Experiment 1 showed that stimulus-response association affects prepotency more 
when children make verbal responses than when they make action responses. Why is it 
that making associated verbal UHVSRQVHVHJVD\LQJ³FXS´WR|cup|) is more prepotent 
than making associated action responses (e.g., lifting a |cup| to your mouth)? We suggest 
that the most parsimonious explanation is that the strength of the association between a 
stimulus object and its name is greater than the strength of association between a stimulus 
object and its action. The preschoolers in the studies reported here knew both the names 
and the actions associated with the familiar objects used in this study (as confirmed in our 
pilot testing). So it is clearly not the case that children were aware of the objects¶QDPHV, 
but unaware of the actions made with them. However, familiarity alone is not sufficient 
to give rise to prepotency. Rather, prepotency emerges when a specific stimulus is 
repeatedly and reliably associated with a specific response . In order for a response to 
become prepotent, it is necessary that the association between stimulus and response is a 
strong one (e.g., Isoda & Hikosaka, 2011; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). Thus, the difference we observed between verbal responses and action 
responses may lie in the strength of their association to specific stimuli. 
To develop this idea further: when verbally labeling objects, names are generally 
used in a highly consistent way. The object |cup| is consistently labeled with the word 
³FXS´, and rarely (if ever) with other labels. This one-to-one correspondence is essential 
for effective communication between speakers, and it makes the association between an 
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object and its name a strong one. In contrast to names, the actions made with objects are 
typically much more variable, and generally involve no communicative intent. For 
example, we commonly act on cups in lots of ways: we pour drinks into them, we hand 
them to other people, we carry them about, we invert them in a dishwasher or clean them 
by hand, and we stack them on shelves or hang them on hooks. While lifting a cup to 
your mouth is certainly something we do with a cup (when using it to fulfill its canonical 
function), this action is not uniquely associated with this object. It is just one of several 
actions commonly made with it. Consequently, on SRC tasks, low one-to-one 
correspondence between this stimulus and response may limit its prepotency. The 
associated actions used in this study were more closely associated with the objects than 
were the unassociated actions. Nevertheless, the strength of these associations may still 
have been relatively weak: too weak to give rise to measurable prepotency in a SRC task. 
Our observation that the prepotency of actions made with objects is low on SRC 
tasks is true for the actions studied in Experiment 1, but does not generalize to all kinds 
of action. The account proposed in the previous paragraph explains why actions made 
with objects are less prepotent than naming. There is, however, clear evidence to suggest 
that some kinds of action can be highly prepotent when preschoolers make them in SRC 
tasks. For example, on the Grass/Snow task, declarative pointing is prepotent (e.g., hear 
³JUDVV´, point to |white card| KHDU³VQRZ´, point to |green card|: Carroll et al., 2012; 
Simpson & Riggs, 2009) and in the Hand game, manual imitation is prepotent (see |finger 
gesture|, make |fist gesture| / see |fist gesture|, make |finger gesture|: Simpson & Riggs, 
2011; Simpson, Cooper, Gillmeister & Riggs, 2013).  
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That both declarative pointing and manual imitation are prepotent is consistent with 
our proposal that stimulus-response association drives prepotency in SRC tasks. 
Declarative pointing involves communicative intent, just like naming, and so requires a 
high degree of one-to-one correspondence (e.g., consistently pointing to named objects). 
Likewise, theories of sensorimotor development (e.g., Piaget, 1952; Heyes & Ray, 2000) 
suggest that imitation becomes prepotent because of the high degree of one-to-one 
correspondence between perceptual representations of our own actions (the stimulus) and 
the motor representations used to make them (the response). Thus, when considering 
where prepotency comes from on developmental tasks, the type of action made is less 
important than the strength of the association between the task¶V stimuli and responses. 
The origin of prepotency in Go/No-go tasks  
Prepotency arises on Go/No-go tasks in a much simpler way. Experiment 2 showed 
that responding was prepotent in all four conditions (Action Associated, Verbal 
Associated, Action Unassociated, Verbal Unassociated). In particular, it is notable that ± 
as observed in the two Unassociated conditions ± prepotency is relatively high even when 
the stimuli and responses are unassociated. This finding is consistent with previous 
research suggesting that a wide range of actions can be prepotent on Go/No-go tasks. In 
particular, evidence from computer-based Go/No-go tasks shows that the response of 
pressing a button can be prepotent when made in response to a wide range of 
unassociated stimuli, including shapes (Espy, 1997), animals (Simpson & Riggs, 2006) 
and lights ()O\QQ2¶0DOOH\	:RRG3HUQHU/DQJ	.ORR). In fact, the 
only behavior that we are aware of in the published literature that appears not to be 
prepotent on Go/No-go tasks is placing a hoop over a box (a variant of the box search 
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task: Simpson & Riggs, 2007). It has been suggested that this behavior may have low 
inhibitory demands because children are slow to produce this response (Simpson et al., 
2014), and delaying responding reduces inhibitory demands (Simpson et al., 2012). 
Taken together, these results suggest that the intention to respond on Go/No-go 
tasks is sufficient on its own to create relatively high levels of prepotency, irrespective of 
any other factor. The intention to make a response on Go trials causes that response to be 
primed. This priming remains active for the duration of the task, including on No-go 
trials. However, although the priming is helpful on Go trials, as it means that the correct 
response can be made swiftly, the priming is not helpful on No-go trials, as it makes it 
more likely that a task-inappropriate response will be made. Poorer No-go performance 
than Go performance reflects the facilitating effect that response priming has on Go trials, 
and the impairing effect it has on No-go trials. 
The data in Experiment 2 provide evidence that any response can be prepotent in a 
Go/No-go task. However, it may still be the case that stimulus-response associations can 
enhance prepotency in Go/No-go tasks under certain circumstances. In the tasks used in 
Experiment 2, Go trials and No-go trials were GLVWLQJXLVKHGE\DQREMHFW¶VFRORUHJsee 
|red cup|, lift to mouth / see |blue cup|, do nothing). The REMHFWV¶LGHQWLW\± the fact that 
they were cups ± was irrelevant, and could be ignored. That being the case, it seems 
unlikely that information associated with them being cups was activated at all. Without 
the activation of such category-relevant information in these Go/No-go tasks, it is 
unlikely that stimulus-response association would have any effect on prepotency. 
Nevertheless, we suggest that it is quite possible that an effect of stimulus-response 
association could be observed on some variants of the Go/No-go paradigm: specifically, 
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on those variants with rules requiring children to identify the objects presented in the 
task. For example, consider a Go/No-go task with the rules ³see |phone|, say µcup¶ / see 
|cup|, say nothing´. In order to apply the rules on this task, children would need to 
identify stimuli as either |cups| or |phones|. It is possible that more inhibitory control 
would be required on No-go trials where the stimulus and the Go response are associated 
(e.g., stopping a Go response of saying ³FXS´ when |a cup| is presented) than on No-go 
trials where they are not (e.g., stopping a Go response of saying ³FXS´ when |a phone| is 
presented). This intriguing possibility should be explored in future research. 
When do preschoolers use inhibitory control in everyday life? 
Our findings have implications for preschoolers¶ behavior outside the laboratory. 
First, our Go/No-go data suggest that when the alternative is to do nothing, almost any 
behavior can be highly prepotent. In contrast, our SRC data suggest that high levels of 
prepotency are far more restricted when selecting between alternative responses. Thus, in 
everyday life, preschoolers may find doing nothing particularly difficult ± since it 
effectively requires them to successfully inhibit any behaviour that occurs to them (as in a 
Go/No-go task). Conversely, they may find it much easier to inhibit one behaviour in 
order to perform another (as in SRC tasks). Thus, these data suggest that if you wish to 
stop preschoolers engaging in a specific behavior, it may be more effective to get them to 
do something else, rather than insist that they do nothing. 
Second, the research presented here investigated preschoolers¶ verbal and manual 
behaviour with objects. The findings suggests that familiar verbal behavior with objects 
(i.e., naming) is more prepotent than familiar manual behavior with objects (i.e., making 
the actions associated with their use). This suggests that outside the laboratory, children 
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may find it easier to be flexible when acting on objects than when naming them. This 
proposal offers a potential answer for a long-standing question in developmental 
psychology (e.g., Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith & Boucher, 1994): How can it be that young 
children, with their weak inhibitory control, manage to successfully engage in pretend 
play (e.g., pretending that a hair brush is a microphone)? The present data suggest the 
possibility that little inhibitory control is required to replace a familiar action on an object 
(brushing your hair) with an unfamiliar action on the same object (putting a brush to your 
mouth). That being the case, pretend play may in fact require very low levels of 
inhibitory control. 
Conclusion 
SRC and Go/No-go tasks are the most widely used measure of inhibitory control in 
preschool children (used in about 70% of studies ± Peterson et al, 2016). Despite such 
widespread use, this is the first study to systematically examine how prepotency is 
created in these two types of task: it is also the first study to explain why these measures 
of inhibitory control are actually measures of inhibitory control at all. The present data 
suggest that ± beyond a common role for intention ± prepotency is created in 
fundamentally different ways in SRC tasks and Go/No-go tasks. Future research should 
investigate whether this difference is observed across the whole of development, and also 
to what extent it interacts with other task characteristics (such as how responding is 
cued). Given the widely acknowledged importance of inhibitory control during the 
preschool and early school years, gaining a fuller understanding of such a fundamental 
question is likely to have important broader implications for cognitive development in the 
preschool years, and beyond. 
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Figure 1. The eight objects used in Experiments 1 and 2. The familiar objects were a 
phone, a cup, a hammer and a crayon. The unfamiliar objects were a doorstop, a touch-
light, a hose part, and a plumbing part. 
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Figure 2. Accuracy on SRC tasks in Experiment 1 by Type of response and Stimulus-
response association. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3. Accuracy on Go/No-go tasks in Experiment 2 by Type of response, Stimulus-
response association and Trial type. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. 
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Table 1. Examples of the rules used in the SRC and Go/No-go tasks. 
 
 Type of response 
Association Action Name 
Experiment 1: SRC tasks 
Associated See |cup|, put to ear 
See |phone|, put to mouth 
See |cup|VD\³SKRQH´ 
See |phone|VD\³FXS´ 
Unassociated See |plumbing part|, put to ear 
See |doorstop|, put to mouth 
See |plumbing part|VD\³SKRQH´ 
See |doorstop|, VD\³FXS´ 
Experiment 2: Go/No-go tasks 
Associated See |red cup|, put to mouth 
See |blue cup|, make no response 
See |red cup|VD\³FXS´ 
See |blue cup|, make no response 
Unassociated See |red doorstop|, put to mouth  
See |blue doorstop|, make no 
response 
See |red doorstop|VD\³FXS´ 
See |blue doorstop|, make no 
response 
 
